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CAlriINE'fTI 11. SUPElUOR COURT.

[16 C. (2d)'

Jan. 1941.]

[5] lD. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONINSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGSORDER VESTING TITLE-DURATION-"SAID COURT".-In seetion 1012
of the Insuranee Code, providing that the order vesting title of
assets of an insuranee eompany shall eontinue in force until it
appears to "said eourt" that the ground therefor does not exist or
has been removed, the words "said court" refer to the eourt in
whieh the proceeding had its inception, unless there has been a
removal or transfer as eontemplated in section 1040, in whieh case
they refer to the eourt of transfer.

[8. F,. No. 16479. In Bank.-January 6, 1941.]

A. CAMINETTI, Jr., as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.

[6] lD. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONINSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGSREMOVAL OF COMPANY OFl'ICE-oDUE PROCEss.-The removal of the
principal offiee of an insurance eompany to San Franciseo or Los
Angeles, on application of the Insu:ranee Commissioner without a
prior hearing, does not deny due proeess of law, that being afforded
by the hearing authorized in seetion 1012 of that Code.

[1] INSURANCE-oINSUlUNCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION~INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION-CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGS-STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION.-Seetions 1011, 1012 and 1040 of
the Insuranee Code, relating to eonservatorship of insuranee eompanies and authorizing the removal of the prineipal offiee to San
Franeiseo or Los Angeles, must be eonstrued together.

[7] ID. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONINSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGSREMOVAL OF COMPANY OFFICE-oREMOVALFROM SAN FRANCISCO OR
Los ANGELEs.-Under Insurance Code, seetion 1040, authorizing the
removal of the principal offiee of an insurance company by a conservator to San Francisco or Los Angeles, there may be a removal
from San Franciseo, where the Insurance Commissioner maintains
an 'office, to Los Angeles.

:'!

[8] In. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONs-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION':'"
INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROOEEDINGSREMOVAL OF COMPANY OFFICE-oTRANSFEB OF PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING REMOVAL--TIMB FOR TRANSFER.-Under Insurance Code, section 1040, the conservator of an insuranee company may "at any
time" after his appointment and subsequent removal of the prineipal office of the company apply for a transfer of the proceedings,
whieh the court must grant.

[8] ID. - I~SURANCJr: CORPORATIONa--:oRGANlZATION AND, REGULATIONINSOLVlI:NOYAND DISSOLUTION -,- CONSERVATORSHIP PaoCEEDINGSPURPOSE OF PROCEEDINGs.-The purpose of a' eonservatorship proeeeding respeeting an insuranee eompany is not the liquidation
of the eompany, but the eonservation of its assets and business over
the period of stress by the eommissioner who thereafter yields eontrol and direetion to the company's regular offieers.

[9] PROHIBITION - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE - DETERMINATION SCOPE OF RELIEF--GRANT OF WRIT OF MANDATE.-In an original proeeeding in prohibition, the Supreme Court has authority to grant
any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings.
Aeeordingly, in a proceeding to restrain further action in a con·
servatorship' proceeding under Insurance Code, section 1011, after a

[4] ID.-INSURANCE CORPORATIONS - ' ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONINSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGSREMOVAL OJ' COMPANY OJ'FICE-oACTS CoNTEMPLATED.-The removal
by
e~nservator of the principal offiee of an insurance, eompany
to Los Angeles or San Franeiseo, as authorized by Insuranee Code,

a.

3.
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seetion 1040, lies in the diseretion of the eonservator. The statute
does not eon template a eomplete removal of books, assets and business; any offieial aet or statement of the eonservator indieative
of the removal, sueh as the removal of minute books of the eompany .
pursuant to his previous written deelaration of removal, suffiees.

ment itself, and the order denying the original motion to
vacate would therefore come within the exception to the rule
which precludes an appeal from an order refusing to vacate
where it serves to allow two appeals.
For these reasons, I believe the order granting the second
motion should be reversed.

[2] ID.-INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONINSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION-CONSERVATORSHIP PaoCEEDINGSREMOVAL OF COMPANY OFl'ICE-oTRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING REMovAL.-In seetion 1040 of the Insuranee Code deelaring that
in the event of the removal by a eonservator of the prineipal offiee
of an insuranee eompany to San Franeiseo or Los Angeles the eourt
wherein the proeeeding was eommenced "shall" upon appIieation
direct the clerk to transmit the papers, ete., to such eity or <lity and
county, the word "shall" is mandatory.

CAMINETTI V. SUPERIOR COURT.

See ',14 Cal. Jur. 660.
9. See 21 Cal. Jur. 634; 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 567; 22 R. C. L; 8.

·lIrlcX. Dig. References: 1-8. Insuranee, § 11; 9. Prohibition, § 59 .(4).
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removal of the pri:p.cipal' office of the company, as authorized by
section'1040, the ,court may also order the issuance of a writ of man·
date !lo=anding the eourt to transfer the proceeding to the suo
perior eourt of the eounty to which the principal office was removed.
.1

day, petitioner made application, under that section, for an
order transferring the conservatorship proceeding to the Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County; that respondent
Superior Court refused to make such order of transfer but
instead, and, upon the application of the company, purported
to restrain petitioner from removing the principal office of
the company from San Francisco to Los Angeles; that respondent thereupon purported to assume jurisdiction and to
proceed with the hearing of the company's petition, under
seCtion 1012 of the Insurance Code, to terminate the conservatorship proceeding even though it is without jurisdiction
other than to transfer the conservatorship proceeding to Los
Angeles County.
'
In defense of its action, the respondent court sets forth in
its return and brief in support thereof the contention that it
cannot lawfully transfer the conservatorship proceeding to
Los Angeles or refrain from hearing the application to terminate the same. The validity of this defense depends upon the
proper interpretation of several sections of the Insurance
Code.
Section 1011 provides that "The Superior Court of the
county in which is located the principal office of such person
[includes corporation, sec. 19] in this State shall, upon the
filing by the commissioner of the verified application showing
any of the following conditions hereinafter enumerated to
exist, issue its order vesting title to all of the assets of such
[corporation], wheresoever situated, in the commissioner ...
and direct the commissioner forthwith to take possession of
all its books, records, property, real and personal, and assets,
and to conduct, as conservator, the business of said [corpora~
tion], or so much thereof as to the commissioner may seem
appropriate, and enjoining said [corporation] and its officers,
. . . from the transaetion of its business or, disposition of its
property un til the further order of s;lid court: . . . [then
follow ten enumerated grounds warranting an order of conservatorship] . "
Section 1012 provides that "Said order shall continue in
force and effect until, on the application either of the commissioner or of such, [corporation], it shall, aftElr a full hearing,
appear to said court that the ground for said order directing
the commissioner to take title and possession does not exist
or has been removed and that said [corporation] can properly

;

PROCE'EDINGin ,Prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from proceed·
ing with the hearing and determination of a cause now pending before it; Writ granted.
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, W. T. Sweigert, Assistant

.A.ttorney~General, and Neil Cunningham, John L. Nourse and

James
tioner.

A.

Arnerich, Deputies Attorney-General, for Peti-

John H. Riordan and Knight, Boland and Riordan for Respondent.
THE COURT.-In this original proceeding in prohibition
the petitioner, as Insurance Commissioner of the state, seeks
to restrain the respondent Superior Court in and for the
City and County of San Francisco from proceeding with the
hearing and determination of a cause now pending before it.
An alternative writ of prohibition was issued by this court
upon a petition alleging that on August 15, 1940, the petitioner, as Insurance Commissioner, caused to be filed with the
respondent Superior Court, pursuant to section 1011 of the
Insurance Code, an application for order appointing him conservator of the Mount :Moriah Life Insurance Company, a
California corporation having its principal office and place
of business in San FraI;lcisco ; that on the same day, and pursuant to stich request, the respondent court made its order appointing petitioner conservator, vesting in him as such title
to all of the assets of the 'company and directing him to take
possession of its books, records and property with a view to
conducting the business until the further order of the court,
the exclusion of the officers and agents of the company,
who were thus precluded from interfering with his activities
as conservator; that thereupon petitioner immediately took
possession' of the company's assets and records as conserv,ator
and on the same day removed the principal office of the company to the city 'of Los Angeles, under the provisions of
section 1040 of the Insurance Code; that on the following

~

to
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-
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--------------~~~~- ~.--
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resume title and possession of its property and the conduct
of its business".
Section 1040 provides that" At any time after an order
is made under sections 1011 [conservatorship] or 1016 [liquidation], the commissioner may remove the principal office
of the [corporation] proceeded against to the city and county
of San Francisco or to the city of Los Angeles. . In event of
such removal, the court wherein the proceeding was commenced shall, upon the application of the commissioner, direct
its clerk to traru;mit all of the papers filed therein with such
clerk to the clerk of the City and County of San Francisco
or of the county of Los Angeles as the case may require. The
proceeding shall thereafter be conducted in the same manner
as though it had been commenced in the county to which it
had been transferred."
, [1] The issues in this case reduce themselves to one of
statutory construction. In enacting the Insurance Code the
legislature eXercised its power to regulate a business peculidrly
charged withil public interest. (Oarpenter v. Pacific Mutual
L. Ins. 00., 10 Cal. (2d) 307, 329 [74 Pac. (2d) 761] ; German
Alliance Ins. 00. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 316 [31 Sup. Ct.
246, 55 L. Ed. '229] ; In re Bean, 207 App. Div. 276 [201· N. Y.
Supp. 827; 828].) In this light the several sections inquestion must be considered together and not as unrelatedprovisions.'
,
[2] The respondent court urges th~t the cOnimis~ioner, as
conservator, having invoked section 1040, must conform
thereto in every particular; That section state~that the commissioner, .once he is appointed conserv'ator, ,iIIlay.remove the
principal offi,ce" of the company proceeded against to San
Francisco or Los Angeles, in which event the court where the
proceeding was: begun "shall ". up'onapplication of the c~n
servator order transfer of the proceeding a:nd papers to the
city chosen.: Section 16 of the InsurailCe Code declares that
as, used therein the word" shall" is mandatory unless otherwise apparent from thc context.. There is nothing in the
context of section' 1040 to indicate that the word "shall"
therein is other than niandat~ry. Upon removal of the principal office of the~eompany to either city, the court wherein the
proceeding was commenced must accordingly transfer the proceeding upon application therefor.

a

•

Jan. 1941.]
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[3, 4] In the view of the respondent court the section
"clearly contemplates . . . an actual or substantial removal
of the principal office of the insurer proceeded against; . . .
the word 'remove' in connection with the principal office of an
insurance company contemplates the moving or removing of
substantially all the physical things and equipment, especially
the business records of the company and also the business
activities theretofore conducted thereat". Whatever the
meamng of the word "remove" in other situations, such a
construction falls wide of the legislative intent with respect
to conservatorship proceedings. Not only does it confuse the
phrase "principal office" with that of "principal place of
business", between which there is often a clear distinction
(Watters v. Hamilton Gas 00., 10 Fed. Supp. 323, 326; Peters
v. Detroit & C. Nav. Co., 24 Fed. (2d) 454, 455; Wicecarver
v. Mercantt'le T. M . .Ins. 00., 137 Mo. App. 247 [117 S. W.
698, 700] ; Mason & Hanger 00. v. Sharon, 231 Fed. 861, 863
[146 C. C. A. 57] ; Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, secs.
4373 and 4651) but it runs counter to the very purpose of a
conservatorship proceeding. Such a proceeding contemplates, not the liquidation of the company involved, but a
conservation of the assets and business of the company over
the period of stress by the commissioner who thereafter yields
the control and direction to the regular officers of the company. It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended
that for the duration of a temporary control by' the commissioner there should be a complete removal of books,
assets and business which would tend to dissipate and ruin
the business of a company subjected thereto. The principal
purpose underlying the provision for removal of the principal
office of the involved insurer either to San Francisco or Los
Angeles and the consequent removal of the conservatorship
proceeding thereto, is unquestionably the convenience of the
commiSsioner who, as such, maintains an office and staff in
both cities. Venue statutes enacted for the convenience and
assistance of public officials in the di.scharge of their duties
are notunusua:l. (State of Oal. v. Superior Oourt, 14 Cal.
App. (2d) 718, 721 [58 Pac. (2d) 1322]; 67 C. J. 77, sec.
122.) The matter rests with the legislature and not with
the courts. Under the unqualified language of section 1040
the removal of the principal office of an insurance company
to the places designated 'lies in the discretion of the cOn-

'"
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servator and in 'our opinion, any official act or statement of
his indicativ~ of such removal is adequate. It appears in the
present case that the conservator removed the Minute Books
of the comp~ny to Los Angeles in effective compliance with
his prior written declaration of removal of the "principal
office" of the Mount Moriah Life Insurance Company from
San Francisco to Los Angeles. By affidavit it appears that
the transfer of other books and records of the company was
iIp.possible because of the auditing thereof by Examiners.
Then, too, the restraining order issued by the respondent court
intervened. Given the purpose of the statute,' there is a sufficient showing of removal of the principal office within the
legislative meaning to require the respondent court to transfer
the conservatorship proceeding under the mandatory language
of the statute.
The rehabilitation sections of our Insurance Code trace
their origin to the New York statute whose history is pertinent. That statute originally provided that after commencement ofa rehabilitation or conservatorship proceeding in the
judicial district in which the involved company had its" principal office'" (sec. 408), the superintendent of insurance "may
remove the principal office of the insurer to the county of
Albany" 'in the event of which removal "the court shall upon
the application of the superintendent, direct the clerk of
the county wherein such proceeding was commenced, to transmit all of the papers filed therein with such clerk to the clerk
of the county of Albany and the proceeding shall thereafter
be conducted in the same manner as though it had been commenced in the county of Albany". (Chap. 30, sec. 412, Cahill's, Consol. Laws of New York, 1931-1935.) For all
practical purposes, this provision and section 1040 here in
issue are alike. As thereafter amended, howeve'r, the New
Yark statute declared that "Any time after the commencement of a proceeding . . . the superintendent may apply
ex parte to the court . . . for an order changing the venue
of,and removing the proceeding to Albany county, or, in the
discretion of the superintendent, to any other county of this
state in which he deems that such proceeding may be most
economically and efficiently conducted. Upon the filing of
,any such application for removal, the court . . . shall direct
tj:J.e clerk of the county wherein such proceeding is then pendjn~ to tra~~it all of the papers filed ther{li:u. with such clerk

.
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to the clerk of the county to which such proceeding is removed)
and the proceeding shall thereafter be conducted in such other
county as though it had been commenced in such county."
(Art. 16, sec. 530, Cahill's Consol. Laws of New York, 1939
and 1940 Supps.) (Italics added.)
This transition of the parent statute from one contemplating the removal of the "principal office" of the insurer to
Albany County followed by a transfer of the proceeding to
that county, to one permitting the transfer of the proceeding
to any county "in the discretion of the superintendent"
(without any necessity for the prior removal thereto of the
principal office of the company involved) strengthens the
belief that the transfer of such a rehabilitation proceeding is
intended to facilitate the work of the conservator. The complete removal of the principal office and business of the company to another city might not only handicap his work, but
frustrate the whole purpose of the rehabilitation proceeding.
[5] The respondent court also urges that before a removal
and transfer may be effected the hearing contemplated by
section 1012, to determine whether "the ground for said order
directing the commissioner to take title and possession does not
exist or has been removed", must occur in the county wherein
the proceeding was commenced and the conservator appointed.
This point is grounded principally upon the language "said
court" appearing in section 1012. Such a construction would
actually serve to nullify the provision in section 1040 which
declares that after removal of the principal office to either
county and the consequent transfer of the cause thereto, "The
proceeding shall thereafter be conducted in the same manner
as though it had been commenced in the county to which it
had been transferred". When the relevant sections of the
Code are read in relation to one another, it is clear that the
phrase "said court" in section 1012 refers to the court in
which the proceeding was commenced only when there is no
removal or transfer as contemplated in section 1040. Otherwise it applies to the court of transfer which under the positive language of section 1040 shall then conduct" the proceeding . . . in the same manner as though it had been
commenced in the county to which it had been transferred",
Any other construction would violate the plain language and
intention of the legislature. Moreover, to restrict under all
circumstances the meaning of the words "said court" ap-

846
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pearing in section 1012 so as to confin~ the hearing ~rovided
for in that· section to the court wherem the proceeding had
its inception would be to nullify in many instances the right
,
of the conservator
under section 1040 to remove " at any
time" after his appointment the insurer's principal office and
then to apply for a transfer of the proceeding to one of the
two places designated in the latter section. [6] The statute
requires only that the commissioner, as conservator, make
application to the court for an order directing the clerk. to
transfer the proceeding. Such action is purely procedural
and has no bearing on due process. Due process is afforded
by the hearing authorized in section 1012, which can as well
be had in the Superior Court to which the proceeding is transferred.
[7J The respondent court contends further that the removal provision of section 1040 was intended to permit removal of the principal office of a company and transfer of a
rehabilitation proceeding "to" but not "from" San Francisco. In brief, it urges that such transfer may be made from
any county to either San Francisco or Los Angeles, the places
designated in the statute, but that such transfer may not be
made from one of said designated places to the other. This
contention, . far from being borne out by the history of the
statute, seems actually to be precluded thereby.
The Liquidation Act, as originally enacted (Stats.· 1919,
p. 268) provided in section 12 that at any time after commencement of a proceeding thereunder the commissioner
might remove the principal office of the company involved" to
the city and county of San Francisco". At that time, the
only office maintained by the commissioner was located in
San Francisco by virtue of statutory requirement. (Sec. 592,
Pol. Code.) Th~s section was amended in ·1927 by adding
thereto "and. shall also. keep an office in the City of Sacramento". In 1935 it .was codified and became section 12905
of the Insurance Code, at which time there was added thereto
"and an office in the City of Los Angeles". In conformity
with such amendment, the legislature amended the 1919 Liquidation Act and incorporated it in the Insurance Code as
section 1040. Since 1935, therefore, the section has required
the commissioner to maintain offices in San Francisco, Sacramento and Los Angeles. When the several sections of the
Insurance Code are read as a whole, it is clear that they pro-

Jan. 1941.]

CAMINETTI V. SUPERIOR COURT.

847

vide that while a conservatorship proceeding must be commenced in the county wherein the insurer has its principal
office (sec. 1011), the conservator may remove at any time
after his appointment such principal office "to the City and
County of San Francisco or to the City of Los Angeles"
and that the court "shall", upon application, then order the
proceeding transferred to San Francisco or Los Angeles as
the case may be (sec. 1040, supra). This provision is clear
and unqualified. The absence of any qualifying phrase compels the construction that regardless of where the proceeding
is commenced it lies within the discretion of the commissioner,
as conservator, to remove the principal office of the insurer
to either of the two cities designated in the statute and to
petition the court for a transfer of the proceeding to conform
thereto. It appears in the 'COmmissioner's brief "that the
main office of the Bureau of Liquidation has been located
. . . in the City of Los Angeles for a number of years and
that the said H. A. Benjamin is in charge thereof with a
trained staff of personnel experienced and qualified in the
handling of all matters appertaining to insurance companies
taken over under conservatorship or placed in liquidation;
that it is the [Commissioner'S] judgment that the conservatorship in all said proceedings can best be handled in the office
of the Bureau of Liqt'.idations . . . in the City of Los Angeles." The inconvenience to a San Francisco or Los Angeles company which may result from a transfer of the proceeding to the other county can be no greater than that to a
company in the northernmoBt county of the state resulting
from the transfer to Los Angeles County of a like proceeding
or the inconvenience to a company in the southernmost county
of the state resulting from a transfer to San Francisco. Nowhere in the statute do we find a qualifying phrase to the
effect that all proceedings commenced in the northern part
of the state can be transferred· only to San Francisco while
those arising in the southern part of the state can be transferred only to Los Angeles. Likewise there is no qualifying
phrase that proceedings commenced either in San Francisco
or Los Angeles may not be transferred to the other.
Throughout the proceeding in the respondent court the
commissioner repeatedly sought to establish a lack of jurisdiction in the respondent court to proceed after his removal
of the principal office of the insurer and his application

r

,",

848

CAMINETTI V. SUPERIOR COURT.

[16 C. (2d)

for a transfer of the proceeding to comply therewith. At
no time did he waive the right to claim a lack of jurisdiction
in the court. [8] In any event he has the right "at any
time" after his appointment as conservator and subsequent
removal of the principal. office of the company to apply for a
transfer of the proceeding, which the court must grant.
[9] While the conservator has requested only prohibition
to stay further proceedings in the respondent court, this court
has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues
presented by the pleadings. (Board of Trustees v. State Bd.
of Education, 1 Cal. (2d) 784, 787 [37 Pac. (2d) 84, 96
A. L. R. 775] ; 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-Year Supp. 567, sec. 29.) The
respondent· court is therefore required not only to refrain
from further action in the conservatorship proceeding but
to transfer that proceeding to Los Angeles County in conformity with the conservator's removal of the principal office
of the insurer and in pursuance of his application for such
transfer, as authorized by the statutes in question.
In determining this matter we have had access to and have
considered the briefs filed by the respondents in three com-;
panion cases. Nothing in those briefs requires a contrary .
conclusion herein.
Let peremptory writs of prohibition' and mandate issue
respectively restraining the respondent Superior Court from
taking any further steps or proceedings in the conservatorship proceeding, now pending in that court, and directing
that court to transfer the proceeding to the Superior Court
of the State of California in and for the County of Los
Angeles.
Gibson, C. J., did not participate in the decision.
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-I cannot agree that the Insurance Code allows the commissioner, immediately upon his
appointment as conservator of a company having its principal office in San Francisco, to remove that office to Los
Angeles. Undoubtedly the purpose of section 1040 is to
facilitate the work of the commissioner. But as he maintains
an office in San Francisco, removal of the insurance company's
office to Los Angeles appears to be a most drastic procedure
which should not be approved in the absence of express statutory authority therefor.

:'.'.

,""
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By other provisions of the Insurance Code, a company may
be summarily seized by the commissioner under an ex. parte
order of the superior court based upon his verified application therefor. Such an order continues in force until, after
a full hearing, it appears to the court that the ground for it
does not exist or has been removed. (Sec. 1012.) In other
words, the company seized may challenge the grounds asserted by' the cominissioner as justifying his action, and, in
the meantime, he is administering its affairs under the condition that he must eventually establish by judicial decree,
after hearing, his right so to do.
During this time, particularly, his work should be accompanied with a minimum of inconvenience' to the company
whose assets he is conserving. In organizations of any size
there may be many thousands of policyholders and creditors.
To allow him to summarily remove the company's office from
the city where it has been carrying on its business for many
years, and where he has a large administrative staff, seems
to me to impose hardships which the legislature has not sanctioned.
Until 1935, the Liquidation Act (Stats. 1919, p. 268) authorized the commissioner to remove the principal office of a
company whose business he was administering "to the city
and county of San Francisco." When the Insurance Code
was enacted, the legislature made a requirement that the
commissioner shall maintain an office in Los Angeles and
added to the provision authorizing removal the words "or to
the city of Los Angeles." To me, these changes indicate a
legislative purpose to broaden his power of removal to in.clude the new office at Los Angeles, but I cannot read into
them an intention to authorize the removal of an insurance
company's office from San Francisco, where the commissioner
also maintains an office, to IJos Angeles.
For these reasons, I believe that the writs sought by the
applicant should be denied.
Rehearing denied.

Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.
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